Introduction
This paper addresses the effectiveness of auctions and legal unbundling as regulatory measures to make a vertically integrated activity more competitive. I analyze a setup in which an unregulated upstream producer sells scarce access rights to a bottleneck network that connects to a distant, super-profitable market. The access rights are scarce in the sense that they are in excess demand.
The upstream producer is vertically integrated into a Vertically Integrated Corporation (VIC) with a downstream firm (henceforth "the downstream integrated firm") that competes with the other independent downstream firms in the auction for the scarce access rights. Figure 1 shows the basic setup. 
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An example of such a setup can be found in the EU electricity market. 1 The upstream producer is a network firm that operates an unregulated cross-border transmission line that can export electricity to a foreign country. Such transmission lines are called interconnectors. Downstream firms are domestic electricity generation firms that compete for access to the interconnector. The electricity market in such a foreign country is, from the point of view of domestic firms, a superprofitable, exclusive market when the expected clearing price is high and the interconnector capacity scarce. There is indeed a dramatic shortage of interconnector capacity between the EU countries, which, most of the time, prevents price convergence between different EU countries (European Commission 2007; European Climate Foundation 2010) . As a result, access rights for export on the interconnector mostly have a positive value. Electricity generators may also be able to produce for a domestic downstream market where they do not need to obtain scarce access rights to 3 interconnector capacity, but instead to gain access to a regulated national transmission network. My analysis does not address the allocation of capacity on national lines. For such analysis see, amongst others, Vickers (1995) , Biglaiser and DeGraba (2001) , Höfler and Kranz (2007) , and Foros, Kind & Sørgard (2007) ..
Because of the shortage of interconnector capacity between the EU countries, new EU laws allow firms, conditional on approval by the national regulators, to build and operate unregulated interconnectors for profit. Such for-profit lines are called merchant interconnectors. EU laws will probably in most cases require merchant interconnectors to allocate capacity non-discriminatorily (European Commission 2004, art. 19 and art. 34; CRE 2010, p.4 ). An auction is the most straightforward manner by which to implement a non-discriminatory allocation of capacity in the electricity industry (ERGEG 2009) . At the moment, not many merchant interconnectors have been built yet, but probably many more will be built in the future, especially by corporations that are also active in electricity generation (de Hauteclocque and Rious 2009; Van Koten 2011) . As a result, a vertically integrated corporation may own a merchant interconnector (the upstream producer) and an electricity generation firm (the downstream integrated firm), and thus be competing in an auction for access to its own interconnector (the scarce upstream good). Burkart (1995) and Van Koten (2011) show that in such an auction the downstream integrated firm will bid more aggressively, leading to inefficient and discriminatory outcomes. The integrated firm is more likely to win the auction and the profitability of the competing downstream firms is decreased. Van Koten (2011) shows that the legal unbundling of the upstream producer, while guaranteeing that the auction is fair, does not remediate the negative effects of inefficiency and discrimination. The negative effects are caused by the downstream integrated firm maximizing the joint profit made by itself and the upstream producer, and thus bidding more aggressively to increase the auction revenue. I therefore examine the effectiveness of an additional remedy that aims to neutralize the incentive of the downstream integrated firm to bid more aggressively: the remedy of legally separating the downstream integrated firm from the Vertically Integrated Corporation (VIC) that owns both the upstream producer and downstream firm. 2 I use legal separation as specified in the EU (European Commission 2009, article 14) . While the VIC retains the ownership of the downstream integrated firm, and is thus the residual claimant of its profit, it is not allowed to intervene in the day-to-day decision making of the downstream integrated firm. And while the VIC has the right to periodically (e.g. bi-annual) set performance criteria and bonus 4 schemes, these criteria and schemes may depend only on the outcomes of the downstream firm (and not on the outcomes of other -upstream -activities of the VIC).
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The assumption that legal separation can be enforced by the regulator and that the VIC can thus be prevented from giving day-to-day instructions to its affiliated downstream firm is central to this analysis. If legal separation cannot be enforced, then the VIC can instruct the downstream firm directly to maximize the total VIC profits. Such a setting has been analyzed in Van Koten (2011) .
However, legal separation often figures as a policy measure, which suggests that -at least in policy circles -there is a strong belief in its effectiveness. This study may also be of value to those who are more skeptical of the effectiveness of legal separation, as the results show that even if legal separation can be enforced, it will likely not be very effective: The VIC has alternative ways to influence its affiliated downstream firm to act in a way that approximates the maximization of the VIC profits.
When intervention in day-to-day decision making is outlawed, the VIC must delegate decision power to the manager of the now legally independent downstream firm. The VIC can, however, still influence the manager's decisions by setting an ex-ante compensation scheme. The literature on strategic managerial delegation has shown that when an owner must commit to a compensation scheme, he has incentives to set the compensation for his manager as a linear combination of profit and revenue (Vickers 1985; Fershtman and Judd 1987; Sklivas 1987) . I modify such a compensation scheme for use in an auctions setting and show that it would be profitable to offer this compensation scheme to the manager of the legally separated downstream firm. 4 The compensation scheme I consider respects the legal independence of the downstream firm; compensation is based on performance indicators of the downstream firm only. I assume that the other competing independent downstream firms are maximizing profits, as their owners are not able to commit credibly to a compensation scheme other than that of maximizing profits.
Earlier papers examine the effects of the vertical integration of an upstream monopolist with a firm in the competitive downstream market. Vickers (1995) , Biglaiser and DeGraba (2001) , Øystein, Kind and Sørgard (2007) , and Höfler and Kranz (2007) examine the effect of the upstream price on outcomes in the downstream market. Outcomes in the downstream market are determined by Cournot competition (Vickers 1995; Øystein, Kind and Sørgard 2007) , by competition on a
Hotelling line (Biglaiser and DeGraba, 2001) , or are -for maximum generality -left unspecified (Höfler and Kranz 2007) . Øystein, Kind and Sørgard (2007) assume that a non-discrimination 5 regulation could affect the internal organization of the integrated downstream firm in such a way that the downstream firm acts as if it were an independent firm that faces the same net costs of purchasing the upstream input as other downstream firms. Øystein, Kind and Sørgard (2007) do not specify the mechanisms that implement non-discrimination and how these mechanisms may affect or interact with the behavior of the firms. In contrast, I examine the specific mechanisms of legal separation: outlawing day-to-day instructions and requiring compensation schemes to be based on the performance of the downstream integrated firm only, and I show how these mechanisms may interact with the behavior of the VIC and the downstream integrated firm. Legal separation is the most rigorous remedy -short of ownership separation -for implementing non-discrimination.
In the above papers, it is show that the effect of vertical integration is that downstream integrated firms have a cost advantage over their independent competitors. When purchasing the upstream inputs, downstream integrated firms face a net cost equal to the (low) marginal cost of production and not the higher regulated price. As a result of this cost advantage, downstream integrated firms produce more than their independent competitors. My paper is similar in that it is shown that the downstream integrated firm, due to the vertical integration, does not face the same net costs as other firms when buying the upstream input. In the above papers, outcomes for the upstream market are trivial: the price of the upstream input is given ex-ante by a regulator and the upstream input is in abundant supply: The focus of the analyses in the above papers is on the outcomes in the downstream market. In contrast, my focus is on outcomes in the upstream market.
The price of the upstream input is determined by the competing downstream firms bidding in the auction. I further assume that the downstream firms form a rational expectation of the price in the distant, super-profitable market and that they have the same expectation of the price. The price in the distant, super-profitable market is determined in a rational way, taking in account the extra supply resulting from the bottleneck network. For ease of exposure, I will assume that is done by perfect competition. In the example of merchant interconnectors, the price in the foreign country (the distant, super-profitable market) is determined by competition among the foreign downstream producers, taking into account the given, fixed import of electricity over the interconnector. See Joskow and Tirole (2005) for an example of such a setup. These assumptions ensure that both downstream firms will value access to the distant market and will thus make positive bids in the auction for access.
The compensation scheme I use for the manager of the downstream integrated firm -a linear combination of profit and revenue -was originally proposed by Vickers (1985) , Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987) and is here modified for application in an auctions setting. In Vickers (1985) , Fershtman and Judd (1987) , and Sklivas (1987) , the incentive for the VIC to offer his manager a compensation scheme is to create a strategic interaction effect. This effect is absent in 6 second-price auctions and plays only a minor role in first-price auctions. In this paper the main incentive to offer a compensation scheme is to have the downstream integrated firm internalize (at least a part of) the positive effect of higher auction revenues on the profit of the upstream firm. Øystein, Kind and Sørgard (2007) also apply the strategic delegation framework of Vickers (1985) , Fershtman and Judd (1987) , and Sklivas (1987) and assume that owners of all firms, both integrated and independent, can implement compensation schemes. 5 This is, however, not a realistic assumption. Owners may have the incentive to announce a compensation scheme, but they also have the incentive to secretly instruct their manager to maximize profits. Without a commitment device to "tie their hands", independent firms cannot commit to a compensation scheme (Dewatripont 1988; Katz 1991; Williamson 1983) . The legal separation of firms, verified and enforced by a regulator, is a commitment device. 6 I therefore assume that only the VIC, the owner of the legally separated downstream integrated firm, can commit to a compensation scheme.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. 
The model
I assume that a downstream firm does not know the value of its competitors for the good to be auctioned: it thus treats it as a random variable, drawn from a distribution which, for the sake of tractability, I will assume to be uniform. 7 This assumption allows me to derive closed-form expressions. I further assume that a VIC fully owns the downstream firm and a part  of the upstream firm that organizes the auction.
Two types of bidders participate in the auction. The first is a downstream firm owned by the VIC, labeled as integrated bidder V. In the analyses there is only one, unique integrated bidder V.
5 I use the term "compensation scheme", for compensation schemes with a strictly positive weight on revenues. I use the term "maximizing profit" for compensation schemes with a zero weight on revenues and a positive weight on profits. 6 This assumption may be disputed. If the VIC can circumvent the legal separation and give -illegally -day-to-day instructions to its affiliated downstream firm, then the VIC cannot credibly commit to a cost weight. However, the VIC can then instruct the downstream firm to maximize the total profits of the VIC, a setting that has been analyzed in Van Koten (2011 The second type is a downstream independent firm, labeled as independent bidder X. When analyzing outcomes in the second price auction, I will allow for any number n of independent bidders X. In the first price auction, which is mathematically more complex than the second price auction, I will allow for only one independent bidder X, so as to be able to derive a closed-form solution. The bidding function of integrated bidder V is determined by its manager, referred to as manager V m . Manager V m receives remuneration according to a compensation scheme set by the VIC. The other type of firm, X, is independent and the firm owner cannot credibly offer its manager ("X m ") incentives that differ from profits maximization (Dewatripont 1988; Katz 1991; Williamson 1983) . As a result, the bidding incentives of a manager "X m " and his firm X are identical, and I will thus not distinguish between the two and will refer to the independent firm type as an independent bidder X.
In line with the literature, I assume that there exists a differentiable, strictly increasing bidding
The VIC wants to maximize the joint profit from its downstream and upstream firms. Because of legal separation, the VIC cannot influence the day-to-day decision-making of its integrated downstream firm V. It therefore offers its manager V m a compensation scheme that serves its interests best, while respecting the rules for legal unbundling. 9 For the compensation schemes to be effective, it must be credible: it should be a part of a Nash equilibrium.
One possibility, as considered by Vickers (1985) , Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987) , is to give manager V m a compensation w proportional to a linear combination of profits and revenue. 10 Sklivas (1987) shows that such a compensation scheme w is equal to a proportion of the revenues minus costs, where the costs are weighted by a factor a . u . 9 For a compensation scheme not to violate legal independence, it ought to be based on performance indicators of downstream firm V only, and not on profit indicators of the VIC or the upstream firm. 10 Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987) considered the effect of compensation schemes in the context of two competing firms who each have a manager that makes the crucial output and pricing decisions. They found that, due to an interactive effect, the optimal compensation scheme has a cost weight a such that a >1 (a <1) for Bertrand competition (Cournot competition); the optimal compensation scheme exaggerates (understates) part of the costs and makes the firms competing weaker (stronger). The firms become "fat cats" ("top dogs") in the sense of Fudenberg and Tirole (1984) .
(where w is the compensation,  is the profit, R is the revenue, a is the linear weight, and i denotes the proportion),
From here on, I will refer to factor a as the cost weight. Setting 1 a  gives the manager the incentive to be more concerned about costs and less about revenue. Such a manager can thus be expected to be less focused on expansion and more on cost-cutting. In contrast, setting 1 a  gives the manager the incentive to be less concerned about costs and more about revenue. Such a manager can thus be expected to be more aggressive and more focused on expansion in the market. From this perspective, normal profit maximization is the special case where the cost weight is set equal to unity: 1 a  . Proportion i is determined endogenously in the model. As the expected compensation for manager V m must equal his reservation wage
In an auction, the costs and returns are expected values that are endogenously determined by the bids. In this case, the expected compensation for manager V m is 
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x b ab , is the expected cost of realizing the "revenue".
Results
Second-price auctions
It is a well-known result that in second-price auctions, bidders have a weakly dominant strategy to set their bid equal to their value, regardless of the number of bidders in the auction or their bidding strategies (e.g., see Krishna, 2002) . Therefore, the independent bidders X will bid their values. Manager V m effectively only pays proportion a of his bid, and thus set a times his bid equal to his value:  xb is the probability of manager V m winning the auction.
The result in proposition 1 is general and holds for any distribution of values. Cost weight a modulates the aggressiveness of bidding of manager V m ; a cost weight smaller than one induces him to bid more aggressively, and one larger than one to bid less aggressively. This is an intuitive result: a cost weight smaller (larger) than one makes the manager less (more) concerned about costs and more (less) about revenues. The VIC sets the cost weight so as to maximize its profit function.
This profit function can be characterized as follows: 
mb , is the net expected auction revenue that V pays; this is equal to 1   times the highest expected bid from the n competing independent bidders conditional on V winning. The third term,
to the proportion of ownership by the VIC,  , times the expected payment of all the independent bidders X i , conditional on V losing. V can lose either by having the 2 nd highest bid or by having a lower bid. When V has the 2 nd highest bid, it loses the auction and sets the price to be paid by the winner of the auction; the winning independent bidder X i must thus pay the bid of V, V b . When V has a bid lower than the 2 nd highest bid, it loses the auction and does not set the price; the expected payment by a winning independent bidder is the 2 nd highest bid from the (n-i) independent bidders that have a higher bid than V.
Assuming that values are drawn from independent and uniform distributions, the VIC can set an optimal cost weight that maximizes the profit function. Proposition 2 presents the result.
12 Strictly spoken, when , and that the cost weight decreases in the ownership share: the VIC wants the integrated bidder to bid more aggressively, and increasingly so as the VIC owns a larger share  of the upstream firm. Bidding more aggressively makes independent bidders X pay more when they win the auction, which increases the profits of the VIC. Also, the higher the number n of independent firms, the higher the expected auction revenue and the smaller the relative gain of bidding aggressively. Figure 2 shows the bidding functions of integrated bidder V for different ownership shares when V competes with one independent bidder X. 
: a VIC that has no ownership share in the upstream firm prefers its bidder to maximize profits in second-price auctions. This explains why the owner of independent bidder X has no incentive to offer its manager "X m " a similar compensation scheme -he has no 11 ownership share in the upstream firm and thus does not receive a share of the auction outcomes.
The effects on auction outcomes are summarized by Proposition 3. e) The ex ante efficiency is decreasing in  .
Proof: See the Appendix.
When the ownership share increases, the auction revenue increases as well (Prop. 1a). Notably, for an auction with two bidders (thus with one competing independent bidder), the auction revenue is equal to 4 12   , which is shown below to be different from auction revenues in first-price auctions.
Also, the total profit of the VIC (the profit of its downstream firm plus its share of the auction revenue) increases (Prop. 1b). Also the strength of the incentive for V to bid more aggressively increases. 13 The strength of this incentive, which I call the "strategic profit", is the relative increase in profits by setting the optimal cost weight. It can be calculated by taking the difference in profits between using a strategy of maximizing total profits (downstream firm profits and  times auction revenue) and of using a strategy (which I call the naïve strategy) of maximizing the profit of only the downstream firm. The profit of independent bidders i X decrease; they are less likely to win, and if they win, they pays a higher price (Prop. 1c). The efficiency of the auction decreases; now, in some cases, V wins without having the highest value (Prop. 1d).
Fig. 3 Outcomes in second-price auctions with one independent bidder
Profit loss for independent bidder Percentage increase in auction revenue Strategic (extra) VIC profit as a percentage of "naïve" total profits Loss of efficiency as a percentage of total efficiency without ownership integration. Discrimination against the independent bidder (decrease in profit)
Strategic profit VIC Efficiency loss
Increased auction revenue Figure 3 shows the effect of ownership share on auction outcomes when the integrated bidder competes with one independent bidder. There is a considerable efficiency loss, 14 up to 6.25%. The gain for the VIC given by the strategic profit 15 is also considerable; a VIC can, by bidding more aggressively, increase its profit by up to 8.3%. 16 The price of the good (the auction revenue) is strongly affected; it can increase by up to 25%. The strongest effect is a discrimination effect against the independent bidder: the expected profit of the independent bidder is decreased by up to 50%. Also at low levels of ownership integration the discrimination effect is considerable; even with an ownership share of only 20%, the profit of the independent bidder is decreased by 10%.
14 The efficiency loss percentage is calculated as 
( 1)
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is the profit maximizing strategy, and
  VIP a the "naïve" strategy. 16 For comparison: the increase in profit without legal unbundling of the downstream firm is up to 16.7%, almost twice as much (Van Koten, 2011). Strategic profit VIC Loss in efficiency Figure 4 shows that effects are strong for low numbers and converge to zero when the number of independent bidders goes to infinity. The discrimination effect of integrated ownership is remarkably strong. Graph (a) shows the loss in expected profits for each competing independent firm, which can be as high as 50%. With two competing independent firms, each of them has a decrease in profits of up to 33%. Even with as many as three competing independent firms, each has a decrease in profits of up to 25%. Graph (c) shows the strength of incentives for V to bid more aggressively, as given by the strategic profit as a percentage of the naïve profit. This can be as high as up to 8.3% with one competing bidder, up to 4.7% with two competing bidders, and up to 2.8%
with three competing bidders. Graph (d) shows the loss in efficiency, which represents a considerable social loss. , an effect I will call the "interaction effect". The VIC can use the interaction effect to strategically influence the bidding schedule of X. For such an interaction effect to occur, X needs to know the value of the cost weight.
In the main analysis I will assume that X is rational and X is thus able to calculate the optimal cost weight for the VIC. I will also assume that the rules on legal separation forbid the VIC from spreading false information about the compensation scheme. As a result the VIC can be sure that the compensation scheme it announces is known and believed by independent bidder X; this gives the VIC a first mover's advantage. It is ironic that precisely legal separation -meant to increase competition -is a means of credible commitment that gives the VIC a first mover's advantage.
Below, I will relax these two assumptions. Figure 5 depicts the timeline of events in the auction. At time 1, the VIC implements a compensation scheme for manager V m with cost weight a , and X is informed of its compensation scheme (or deduces it by calculating the profit maximizing choice of compensation scheme for the VIC). Note that the owner of independent bidder X can only credibly instruct X to maximize profits (Williamson (1983) . 
Likewise, the expected profit of independent bidder X with value realization
The expected compensation for manager V m is:
To 
The maximum bid b is equal to
Proof: See the Appendix.
Cost weight a modulates the aggressiveness of bidding of manager V m in a comparable way as in second price auctions: a cost weight smaller than one induces him to bid more aggressively, and one larger than one to bid less aggressively. However, a new effect is that independent bidder X will now accommodate the aggressive bidding of V and also bid more aggressively; the abovementioned interaction effect.
The profit function of the VIC in first-price auctions is equal to the profit of firm V plus the ownership share  times the total auction revenue: , the VIC with a first mover's advantage in first-price auctions sets the cost weight higher than unity to make V bid less aggressively and to lower the auction revenue. This is profitable because of the interaction effect in first-price auctions; overstating the costs of bidding makes V a "fat cat" (Fudenberg and Tirole 1984) , and the competing independent bidder reacts by also bidding less aggressively which lowers , the VIC sets a lower cost weight in first-price auctions than in second-price auctions. This is a result of the interaction effect in first-price auctions, which makes the independent bidder also bid more aggressively which decreases the asymmetry of the auction and thereby makes lowering the cost weight less costly for the VIC. to 16%, and increases the profit of the VIC by up to 5%, and increases the profit of X by up to 24%.
The asymmetry between X and V (V bids weaker than X) leads to a small efficiency loss up to 0.6%. When the ownership share is larger than 0.3, the aggressive bidding of V increases the expected price by up to 64%, increases the profits of the VIC by up to 12%, 19 and decreases the profits of X by up to 61%. The asymmetry between X and V (V bids stronger than X) leads to an efficiency loss up to 6%. Comparing first-price and second-price auctions, restricting the focus on markets with one competing independent downstream firm, the VIC prefers first-price auctions above second-price auctions when it has either a low or a high ownership share. The VIC has a higher profit in firstprice auctions than in second-price auctions when its ownership share is lower than 0.18 
the interaction effect lowers (increases) the expected winning price which lowers (increases) the expected auction revenue. For ownership shares in between, the VIC prefers second-price auctions.
The VIC without a first mover's advantage
One of the assumptions in the preceding model is that the rules on legal separation forbid the VIC from spreading false information about the compensation scheme. As a result the VIC can be sure that the compensation scheme it announces is known and believed by independent bidder X; 19 For comparison: without legal unbundling of the downstream firm the increase in profits is up to 8.3%. A VIC would thus welcome legal unbundling of its downstream firm. 20 Determined by numerical approximation.
Percentage  20 this gives the VIC a first mover's advantage, which enables the VIC to take advantage of the interaction effect as shown above.
Once this assumption is relaxed and the VIC is allowed, or otherwise able, to provide false information about the compensation scheme, the VIC cannot credibly commit to just any compensation scheme. In the second step in the timeline in Figure 4 , t 2 , the VIC now is able to change the compensation scheme with a different cost weight a ; as a result the VIC has no longer a first mover's advantage and the auction outcomes are less favorable for the VIC.
I calculate the Nash equilibrium cost weight by first supposing that the VIC announces a compensation scheme with cost weight a , and then, assuming that independent bidder X believes the announcement, maximizes its profits [ advantage cannot strategically use the interaction effect in first-price auctions and therefore sets the cost weight equal to unity for no ownership. Interestingly, the cost weight in first-price auctions without first mover's advantages is close to the cost weight in second-price auctions, but lower and increasingly so when the ownership share increases. the VIC without a ban on spreading false information about the compensation scheme becomes a burden for a VIC that has a relatively small ownership share of the upstream firm. For higher ownership shares, the strategic profit is very close to that in the first-price auction with a first mover's advantage.
Revenue equivalence
The previous exposition shows that revenue equivalence does not generally hold for these types of auctions. Restricting the focus on markets with two bidders, of which one is independent and one is integrated with full ownership, the auction revenue is approximately equal to 0.42 in second price auctions, to 0.55 in first-price auctions with a first mover's advantage, and to 0.52 in first-price auctions without a first mover's advantage.
This should not be surprising: one of the sufficient assumptions for revenue equivalence, symmetry, does not hold, and the asymmetry that is introduced in this model, a cost weight, affects the auction revenue different for different auction formats. In first-price auctions independent bidders accommodate the bidding of the integrated bidder due to the interaction effect, but do not do so in second-price auctions.
One of the assumptions in the above model is that X is perfectly informed about the value of the cost weight. Relaxing this assumption can reinstate revenue equivalence: if independent bidders in first-price auctions are not informed about the strategic delegation used by the VIC and thus assume 22 that the integrated bidder maximizes profit (a cost weight equal to unity), then independent bidders do not change their bidding and as a result revenue equivalence between first and second-price auctions holds. Proposition 6 formalizes this intuition.
Proposition 6: When independent bidders X i (incorrectly) believe integrated bidder V to maximize downstream profits, and this belief of independent bidders X i is known to V and the VIC, then the auction revenue is identical in first-price and second-price auctions.
Proof: See the Appendix.
The bidding behavior of independent bidders in the auction sketched in Proposition 6 is not equilibrium, and independent bidders are likely to update their belief and to adapt their bidding schedule to accommodate the aggressive bidding of the integrated bidder, thus again upsetting revenue equivalence.
Does the VIC want legal unbundling?
As the analyses in Sections 3.1 and 3.2 show, the VIC is always better off under legal unbundling than under ownership unbundling.
The VIC is also better off under partial legal unbundling (of only the upstream firm) than under legal unbundling (of both the upstream and downstream firm), except in first-price auctions when ownership share are small. In second price auctions the VIC earns the highest profit when the bidding function of its integrated downstream firm maximizes the combined profits of its downstream and upstream firms (see Van Koten 2011) , and under partial legal unbundling the VIC can order its downstream firm to do so. The VIC cannot order its downstream firm to do so under legal unbundling, but instead designs a compensation scheme that motivates the integrated bidder to choose a bidding function that imperfectly approximates such a maximizing bidding function. As a result, the profit of the VIC is lower under legal unbundling than under partial legal unbundling. For the same reason the VIC is better off with partial legal unbundling in first-price auctions for high ownership shares. The interaction effect, however, has a small effect on profits that becomes positive when the ownership share is zero or very small. In this case the VIC sets the cost weight larger than one to make the integrated bidder act as a "fat cat" to lower its expected payment when it wins the auction. As a result a VIC prefers legal unbundling when its ownership share is smaller than 0.13
22 Determined by numerical approcimation.
Conclusions
I modeled a Vertically Integrated Corporation (VIC) that owns both a monopoly upstream firm and a downstream firm in a competitive market. As the monopoly upstream firm provides an essential, scarce input, the VIC has been forced by regulation to allocate its products or services by auction. In an earlier paper, Van Koten (2011), I showed that a VIC could increase nonetheless its profits by having its downstream firm bid more aggressively; which increases the profits of the VIC, lowers welfare, and lowers the profits of competing downstream firms. In the present paper, I
explored in a similar setup to which extent the additional legal separation of the downstream firm from the VIC could improve auction outcomes. When the downstream firm is legally separated, the VIC can no longer implement a compensation scheme to maximize the profits of the overall VIC.
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However, the compensation scheme analyzed in this paper mimics maximizing of the total VIC profits to a considerable degree, while respecting the legal separation. By implementing this compensation scheme, the VIC increases its profits, increases the auction revenue, decreases efficiency and decreases the profits of independent downstream firms.
My model suggests that ownership separation is a solution: once the VIC is not the residual claimant of the auction revenue any more, it loses the incentive to have its integrated firm bid excessively aggressively. Applied to the electricity market this remedy implies outlawing VICs to have their generator firms bid for capacity on its merchant interconnectors. Another possible remedy is to strictly regulate the auction revenue and prevent VICs from receiving the auction revenues of their upstream firm, and instead use rate-of-return regulation. Applied to the electricity market this remedy implies outlawing the building and operating of merchant interconnectors by VICs that own generation firms. Alternatively, regulators might forbid use of the compensation scheme. However, this requires regulators to have a very good understanding of the operations of the downstream firm; they have to be able to determine (and, likely, to defend in court) to which extent a compensation scheme maximizes the profit of the downstream firm as opposed to the profit of the VIC.
Appendix
Proposition 2: In a second-price auction with n+1 bidders, of which n are independent and one is integrated, the VIC sets the cost weight for the integrated bidder equal to
Proof: Using V for the integrated bidder and X for the independent bidders, the profit function for the VIC has been derived by Van Koten (2011) ( 1)(1 )( )
into equation 1 and simplifying gives:
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then manager V wins with probability one (as
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the expected profit of the VIC is then:
The ex ante expected profit of the VIC is thus equal to:
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Differentiating the expected profit of the VIC to a gives the first order condition:
Setting the first order condition equal to zero and solving for a gives: 
The strategic profit, the increase in profits relative to not setting a cost weight, is equal to
c) The expected profit of i X , 
[0] 1
Proof:
a) The ex ante expected auction revenue, 
b) The ex ante expected profit of the VIC,
The relative increase in profits by setting a cost weight is equal to
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is increasing.
The relative increase in profits by setting a cost weight is equal to
c 
The relative loss in profit for an independent bidder is then:
Efficiency is equal to the profit of the n independent bidders, the profit of the VIC, and the auction revenue that has not been received by the VIC: 
24)
Furthermore, a solution should fulfill the following additional constraint:
(a bidder with value zero bids zero). 
26)
Adding up 27) and 29) gives
Integrating 32) over 0 until the maximum bid b using [0] 
Therefore the maximum bid b is given by
Integrating 32) over 0 until b using
Applying 36) to 25) and 26) gives 37) 
